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ASK THE PROFESSOR:
DID THE 7TH CIRCUIT
PROPERLY RULE IN
SENTINEL II?
RONALD H. FILLER1

The short answer is YES; the long answer
is TIME WILL TELL.2
On March 19, 2014, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the
ruling in the lower federal district court case
and ruled that the pre-petition transfers and
the post-petition transfers from the estate of
Sentinel Management Group (“Sentinel”), a
firm registered as both a futures commission
merchant (“FCM”) with the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”)
and as an investment adviser (“IA”) with the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”), were protected from being avoided.3
As noted in more detail below, the Seventh
Circuit based its decision on the interpretation of a plain reading of two specific bankruptcy code provisions (Sections 546(e) for the
pre-petition transfer and Section 549 for the
post-petition transfer). However, the Seventh
Circuit did, without any explanation or analysis, agree with some of the conclusions of law
noted in the district court case that did not in
any way form the basis for its decision. It is
this language in the Seventh Circuit’s opinion
that might be most concerning for FCMs in
the future. However, the 14 FCMs involved in
this case should be rejoicing.

Setting of the Federal District
Court Case

Sentinel was an unusual FCM in that it
did not engage in futures trading activities

on behalf of its customers.4 Sentinel was registered as a FCM solely to receive customer
assets held by other FCMs.5 Each FCM thus
opened a customer account on the books of
Sentinel, each labeled as “FCM’s Customer
Omnibus Account”. Sentinel then invested
the customer assets of these other FCMs in
a customer segregated account, with each
FCM selecting a different trading strategy
as permitted by CFTC Rule 1.25.6 Sentinel
also offered an asset management service for
other clients. Sentinel thus provided an asset
management investment service primarily
for two groups, with each group subject to
different regulatory requirements. The first
group, namely, the other FCMs, that invested
futures customer assets that they held in their
respective Customer Segregated Accounts
into the Sentinel Customer Segregated Account, were referred to as the “SEG 1 Pool”
in this case. The second group of Sentinel
customers, namely the other private investors, including hedge funds, corporations and
proprietary assets of FCMs, were referred to
as the “SEG 3 Pool”.7 The SEG 1 Pool reCONTINUED ON PAGE 3
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quired Sentinel to be registered as an FCM. The
SEG 3 Pool required Sentinel to be registered as an
IA. As a registered FCM and IA, Sentinel was thus
required to keep the assets in the SEG 1 Pool and the
SEG 3 Pool separate and distinct from each other. It
did not.8 Sentinel pooled the assets of both the SEG
1 Pool and the SEG 3 Pool to purchase securities, including repo transactions. When the credit markets
started to contract in 2007, many of Sentinel’s repo
counterparties ceased doing business with Sentinel
or required greater financial protections. In August
2007, Sentinel’s house crashed.
On August 20, 2007, Sentinel filed an emergency order with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, seeking an order approving the distribution of the proceeds of the securities sold to Citadel.9 This Order was supported
and approved by both the CFTC and the National
Futures Association (“NFA”). On August 21, 2007,
approximately $297 million of the assets managed
by Sentinel were distributed directly into the Customer Segregated Accounts of the 14 FCMs that had
invested their futures customer assets into the SEG 1
Pool. Of this amount, approximately $14,479,000
was distributed directly into the Customer Segregated Account of FCStone. Only a small amount was
distributed to customers who had invested their assets in the SEG 3 Pool.
Frederick J. Grede was appointed as the Liquidation Trustee of the Sentinel estate on December
17, 2007, some four months after the proceeds of
the Citadel sale were distributed to the Customer
Segregated Accounts of the various FCMs that invested their customer assets in the SEG 1 Pool.10 In
September 2008, Mr. Grede brought the action in
the federal district court to avoid (e.g., claw back)
the transfer of the assets that were distributed to the
SEG 1 Pool in August 2007 under the theory that
the assets belonged pro rata to both the SEG 1 Pool
and the SEG 3 Pool.11

The Federal District Court Decision

On January 4, 2013, Judge James Zagel ruled
that the pre-petition transfer was voidable as a preferential transfer and the post-petition transfer of
$14,479,000, that had been distributed to the Customer Segregated Account12 of FCStone in August
2007, must be returned to the bankrupt estate of
Sentinel.13 As noted above, in August 2007, pursuant to a Court Order,14 funds had been distributed
out of the bankrupt estate of Sentinel15 directly into
Customer Segregated Accounts of several Futures
Commission Merchants (“FCMs”), including the
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afore-mentioned Customer Segregated Account of
FC Stone, the Defendant in this case.16 None of the
funds were distributed directly to these FCMs.
Judge Zagel agreed with the Trustee and held, in
essence, as follows:
1. As to the pre-petition transfer, the safe harbor
provisions of Section 546(e) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court could not conceivably be applied
to this case. To do so would be inequitable,
and thus an uneven and arbitrary distribution
to Sentinel’s various customers (e.g., the SEG 1
and SEG 3 Pools) and that Congress did not
intend for this inequitable treatment when it
enacted the safe harbor provisions.
2.

The custody rule adopted by the SEC pursuant
to the IAA, namely SEC Rule 206(4)-2, created
a statutory trust protection as robust as those
set forth under the Commodity Exchange Act
(“CEA”) and applicable CFTC regulations.
Therefore, the SEG 3 Pool customers have an
equally forceful claim to trust protection as the
SEG 1 Pool customers.

3.

FCStone is subject to common law tracing requirements due to the co-equal claims of the
competing trust claimants. The assets distributed to the Customer Segregated Accounts of the
various FCMs back in August 2007 are property of the Sentinel bankrupt estate and were
not “customer property” as defined by the CEA
and applicable CFTC regulations.

4.

The August 2007 distribution to the FCStone’s
Customer Segregated Accounts was not authorized under the Bankruptcy Code or by the
bankruptcy court.

Judge Zagel’s First Conclusion
of Law

Sentinel II is a case of first impression regarding
the bankruptcy of a firm registered as both an FCM
and as an IA. The issue before Judge Zagel in Sentinel II was whether the statutory trust created by
Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b) of the CEA was superior
to the IA Custody Rule adopted by the SEC. Defendant FCStone made several arguments in support of
this theory, namely:
1. The customer protections provided by Congress
in Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b) of the Commodity
Exchange Act of 1936 were stronger than those
resulting from a single SEC regulation requiring
funds to be held with a custodian. In fact, Con-
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gress has never enacted any such similar provision in the IAA.
2.

Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b) of the CEA emphatically states that the assets held in a Customer
Segregated Account must be treated as customer property “belonging to” the customer
regardless of their location. In other words,
the CEA created a “floating trust” over such
customer property17 whereas the IA Custody
Rule merely requires that customer assets be
segregated from the IA’s own assets. Therefore,
Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b) made clear that the
statutory trust imposed on customer segregated
funds means that the assets in question, e.g.,
the SEG 1 Pool assets, could never be treated as
the property of the depository (e.g., Sentinel).
Therefore, unless the SEG 1 Pool assets become
property of the Sentinel estate, it could never be
clawed back by the Trustee and redistributed to
the SEG 3 Pool.

3.

The legislative history accompanying Sections
4d(a) and 4d(b) of the CEA clearly demonstrate
that segregation violations and improper commingling of customer funds do not destroy the
statutory trust created under the CEA.18

4.

Congress did not intend to protect IA advisory
client funds in the same manner as FCM customer funds because no provision under the
IAA provides the specific customer protections
that Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b) do.

5.

The risks unique to the futures markets demand
that FCM customer-held property be afforded
heightened protections compared to IA customer funds.

6.

The CFTC has promulgated a series of detailed
regulations regarding how customer assets must
be held, reported and maintained whereas the
IA Custody Rule merely requires that customer
assets be held in one of three types of custodian
firms.19

Judge Zagel did not accept any of these arguments and
held that the IA Custody Rule is also a statutory trust,
just like Sections 4d(a) and 4d(b), and that Congress
did not intend to elevate protections for customer funds
regulated by the CEA and CFTC regulations over customer funds regulated by the IA Custody Rule. He then
stated: “there is no basis in law for elevating one federal
statutory trust over another absent the tracing of specific
property.”20 Judge Zagel basically holds that when two
trusts require segregation, without analyzing any other
requirement, then the two trusts must be treated equally.
He then stated:
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“Until Congress demonstrates a clear
intention to give commodity customers socalled ‘super priority’ in bankruptcy, I have
no basis for elevating the interests of the
CEA over IAA-protected customers.”21

Judge Zagel’s Second Conclusion
of Law

Judge Zagel also held that FCStone is subject to
common law tracing due to the co-equal claims of
the competing trust claimants. He then stated that
FCStone failed to meet this tracing standard. In fact,
he stated that such tracing was impossible. FCStone’s expert did in fact identify the location of the
SEG 1 Pool assets but this, according to the court, is
indicative of why tracing is not possible in this case.
He then stated:
“But for tracing purposes, the critical
shortcoming of Ms. McCloskey’s report
is that it fails to adequately account for
the fact that none of Sentinel’s customers
(referring to the FCMs) held specific
ownership interests in securities. Rather
they own pro rata portions of investment
portfolios which Sentinel was free to fill
with any of the securities in its pool of
assets so long as those securities met the
portfolio’s investment criteria.”
Judge Zagel believed that the “fungible nature of
cash alone makes it impossible to trace specific securities back to the original customer deposits in this
case.”22 He then stated:
“So, commingling aside, Sentinel’s
investment model makes tracing essentially
impossible because, upon deposit, customer
funds were immediately converted into
an abstract ownership interest. In other
words, Sentinel’s pooled investment model
renders tracing impracticable because there
is no specific form of converted trust property
to trace.”23

In support of FCStone’s position and that of the CFTC,
the critical case to analyze is Begier v. I.R.S.24 Begier
holds, in essence, that trust assets should not be deemed
property of the bankrupt estate and that tracing is not
required if a nexus can be shown between the assets re-
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ceived by the beneficiary and those held in trust by the
debtor. In its Amicus Brief in Sentinel II in the 7th Circuit
case, the CFTC stated:

“The nexus approach requires that the
federal trust claimant must establish ‘some
connection’ between the original trust
assets defined by the relevant statute and
the ‘assets sought to be applied’ to the
trust claim subsequently in circumstances
where the original trust assets have
been commingled or transferred (citing
Begier, 496 U.S. at 65-66). The court has
flexibility in determining what connection
is sufficient in particular circumstances so
long as it ‘applies reasonable assumptions
to govern the tracing of funds…’ These
reasonable assumptions can include,
but are not restricted to, common law
tracing.”25
Judge Zagel held that, since the FCMs deposited cash
with Sentinel, such cash is intangible and cannot be
traced.26 The SEC in its Amicus Brief concurred with
Judge Zagel and distinguished Begier by stating that Begier is inapplicable as Begier did not involve competing
claims by beneficiaries of two trusts, as applies here.27

Judge Zagel’s Third Conclusion
of Law

Judge Zagel held that the transfer of assets to the
Customer Segregated Accounts of FCStone (and all
of the other FCMs) was not authorized by the Bankruptcy Code or by the Bankruptcy Court. As noted
above, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois permitted this distribution
on August 20, 2007.28 Judge Zagel stated that the
Bankruptcy Court did issue an Order stating that
the assets, less a $15.6 million holdback, could be
distributed to the Customer Segregated Accounts
of the various FCMs. Judge Zagel then stated that
the Order said nothing about whether the proceeds
were property of the estate. Approximately, one
year later, on August 8, 2008, the Trustee for Sentinel filed a Motion to Clarify or in the Alternative
to Vacate or Modify the Court’s August 20, 2007
Order. In open court, the judge then explained that
the August 20, 2007 Order had not ruled on the
“property of the estate” issue.

© 2014 THOMSON REUTERS
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Appeal of the Federal District
Court Decision

The district court case was appealed to the Seventh Circuit. Oral arguments were held in December
2013. On March 19, 2014, the Seventh Circuit reversed Judge Zagel’s decision, primarily determining
that the pre-petition transfer and the post-petition
transfer to FCStone were proper, and should not be
avoided (e.g., claw-backed), in accordance with Sections 546(e) and 549 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,
respectively, and remanded the case back to the district court.29 30 This article will now analyze the Seventh Circuit decision and provide some commentary
as to whether the Seventh Circuit properly ruled in
this case.

The Seventh Circuit Decision

Judge David Hamilton of the Seventh Circuit, in
a 3-0 decision,31 wrote the opinion for the Seventh
Circuit and narrowly ruled that the pre-and postpetition transfers should not be avoided (e.g., not
subject to being clawed-back) pursuant to Section
546(e)32 and Section 54933 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code. As discussed below, since the Seventh Circuit ruled solely on whether the transfers should or
should not be avoided, it elected not to decide on
the other legal issues addressed by Judge Zagel. As
noted above, its reference to these other conclusions
of law posited by Judge Zagel, without any explanation or analysis, is what is most troublesome.

The Pre-Petition Transfer

A bankruptcy trustee may, pursuant to Section
547(b) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,34 avoid a transfer that took place within 90 days of the filing of
the bankruptcy petition if certain conditions were
met. This provision, as the Seventh Circuit noted,
is designed to
“prevent a debtor approaching bankruptcy
from choosing on its own to favor some
creditors at the expense of others in ways
that are not consistent with the priorities
and preferences of bankruptcy law”. 35

The Seventh Circuit noted that Congress enacted Section
546(e) to exempt payments in securities transactions
from Section 547(b). Section 546(e) exempts transfers,
such as a margin payment, if the transfer constituted a
“settlement payment” or was made “in connection with
a securities contract”.36 The Seventh Circuit then held:
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“We agree with FCStone that Sentinel’s
pre-petition transfer fell within Section
546(e)’s safe harbor. The district court’s
findings of fact show that the transfer to
FCStone was a “settlement payment” and
was made “in connection with a securities
contract’ within the meaning of Section
546(e).”37
The Seventh Circuit then stated:
“Section 546(e) states that the trustee
may not avoid a pre-petition transfer made
to a commodity broker that is either a
‘settlement payment’ .… or ‘in connection
with a securities contract’. The parties
agree that FCStone is a commodity broker
and that the transfer occurred before the
commencement of the bankruptcy case.
The only disputed issues are whether the
transfer was a ‘settlement payment’ or
was made ‘in connection with a securities
contract’ as those terms are defined in the
statute. If the answer to either question is
yes, the safe harbor applies and the prepetition transfer may not be avoided. The
answer to both questions is yes.”38
The Seventh Circuit held that both of these terms
should be broadly interpreted. With respect to
whether the transfer was made “in connection with
a securities contract”, the Seventh Circuit determined that, even though Sentinel’s customers, such
as FC Stone, did not have rights to specific securities, they could authorize Sentinel to purchase or sell
securities as they saw fit. It then stated:
“The fact that the Segment 1 customers
were entitled to cash rather than to the
securities themselves does not change
the fact that these customers’ investment
agreements were contracts for the
purchase and sale of securities.”39
The Seventh Circuit concluded that Judge Zagel’s
decision was not based on the literal text of Section
546(e) but on policy grounds.40 The Seventh Circuit
then stated:
“We understand the district’s court
powerful and equitable purpose, but its
reasoning runs directly contrary to the
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broad language of Section 546(e). The
text of Section 546(e) does not include an
exception for preferential transfers.”41
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that, through Section 5646(e):
“Congress chose finality over equity for
most pre-petition transfers in the securities
industry…. In other words, Section 546(e)
reflects a policy judgment by Congress that
allowing some otherwise avoidable prepetition transfers in the securities industry
to stand would probably be a lesser evil
than the uncertainty and potential lack of
liquidity that would be caused by putting
every recipient of settlement payments
in the past 90 days at risk of having its
transactions unwound in bankruptcy
court.”42
Thus, the Seventh Circuit found “no persuasive
reason to depart from the deliberately broad text of
Section 546(e)”.43

The Post-Petition Transfer

Under Section 549 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code,
a post-petition transfer of property of the estate can
be avoided unless the transfer was authorized under
the bankruptcy code or by the bankruptcy court.44
In Sentinel II, the bankruptcy court issued an order
in August 2007 (the “2007 Order”), shortly after
the filing of the bankruptcy petition, permitting a
distribution of approximately $300,000,000 directly into the customer segregated accounts of some
14 FCMs, including FC Stone. One year later, the
trustee requested the bankruptcy court to clarify the
2007 Order, in particular, that the transfer in 2007
did not affect the trustee’s right to avoid this postpetition transfer. Surprisingly, in 2008, the bankruptcy court held that “its order (issued in 2007)
had not authorized the transfer within the meaning
of Section 549 and thus did not prevent avoidance
of the post-petition transfer.”45 Judge Zagel held
that the 2007 Order thus did not authorize this
transfer within the meaning of Section 549.
The Seventh Circuit disagreed with Judge Zagel’s
conclusion. It held that the 2007 Order “was clearly
authorized by the bankruptcy court” and that its
subsequent order, issued in 2008 was an abuse of
discretion.46 It sensibly determined that the so-called
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clarification ran counter to the “plain language of
the order”.47
The Seventh Circuit then held that it is not necessary for a court to decide whether the property
being transferred belongs to the estate and that the
bankruptcy court need not determine that the transfer involves property of the estate. A court, it held,
can simply authorize a transfer whether the property belonged to the estate or not.48 In this case, the
2007 Order issued by the bankruptcy court “ended
any discussion about its original ownership, and the
disputed property cannot later be clawed back by
the trustee.49 The 2007 Order thus did not reserve
for the Sentinel trustee the right to avoid the transfer
that occurred in August 2007.
The Seventh Circuit then focused on the literal
language of the 2007 Order, holding that the language being asserted by the Trustee is meritless. The
Seventh Circuit’s rational approach focused on the
events that took place in August 2007, namely that:
1. The various FCMs, including FCStone, needed
BONY to release the money within hours of the
original Order being issued. Otherwise, FCStone would have been insolvent itself if it could
not transfer the money to meet its obligations
to its own customers.
2.

The district court’s views would undermine
the ability of involved parties to rely ever on a
bankruptcy court order. In this case, the FCMs
clearly relied on the original Order and should
be allowed to assume that the transfer to their
customer segregated accounts were unencumbered.50

3.

To not allow the transfer that took place in August 2007 would result in losses to its current
customers and creditors, and not those that
would have been affected in August 2007.51

4.

The bankruptcy court should have clarified the
2007 Order before any interested party relies
on the Order.

This ruling reflects proper yet practical reasoning,
emphasizing the reliance test for parties, which receive a post-petition distribution and the fact that
the claw-back would have occurred some seven
years later.

Other Legal Issues Addressed by
Judge Zagel

Had the Seventh Circuit stopped there, one can
easily argue that it simply took a narrow but specific
interpretation of the language in Sections 546(e)
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and 549 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Its practical
reasoning could easily be justified. In future FCM
bankruptcies, interested parties could evaluate
whether the safe harbors of Section 546(e) might
apply to a pre-petition transfer and whether a postpetition transfer was authorized or not by a bankruptcy court.
However, the Seventh Circuit, for some unknown
reason, chose to address some of Judge Zagel’s other
Conclusions of Law noted above, but provided little
or no explanation or analysis of them. In fact, it
chose not to base its decision on any of them.
One of these issues involved whether FCStone was
an initial transferee or an beneficiary of the transfer
as required by Section 550(a)(1) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.52 If so, the transfer could be avoided.
The Seventh Circuit did not decide the ultimate issue
but did state, in a footnote, that FCStone was “necessarily either an initial transferee or a beneficiary
under Section 550(a)(1)”.53 This language in the
footnote could have a significant adverse impact on
future FCM failures. Historically, when one FCM
fails, the CFTC or an exchange, such as the CME,
steps in and works together to find a home quickly for futures customers of the failed FCM so that
monies used to margin the open positions and the
open futures positions themselves of customers at
the failed FCM are transferred to another well-capitalized FCM. This language in the footnote could
theoretically hold up an immediate transfer unless
and until the trustee appointed by the CFTC obtains
an Order from the Bankruptcy Court that expressly
authorizes these transfers. It can take days, if not
weeks, to obtain such an Order from the bankruptcy court. Query, will this case force future trustees
appointed by the court to simply take actions quickly to liquidate all open positions on the books of the
failed FCM. What about those positions held by bona-fide hedgers, which are clearly protected against
any such liquidation by Part 190?54 Query, will this
case be used by future FCM trustees to hold up any
transfers of the open positions of hedgers and their
margin monies to another FCM until the trustee can
obtain a clear bankruptcy court order? This would
be quite troubling in my opinion. Prompt immediate action is required when an FCM fails so that its
customers can be properly protected.
Also, what is most concerning is that it provided
no analysis or explanation as to why an FCM is an
initial transferee. No other case has dealt with this
issue involving FCMs; all other cases involve an insolvent broker-dealer. The crucial test in determining whether a brokerage firm is an initial transferee
is whether the firm exercises dominion and control
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over the assets/funds of the bankrupt estate. Pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act and applicable
SEC regulations, broker-dealers have more control
over their customer assets, especially when the customer purchases securities on margin. On the other
hand FCMs, in my opinion, merely act as an agent
for their customers and provide a mere conduit of
the margin amounts paid by their customers to the
respective clearinghouse.55 The dominion and control test was not addressed by the Seventh Circuit as
it applies to FCMs. Its silence is deafening.56
A second important Conclusion of Law posited
by Judge Zagel involved the concept that the statutory trusts that were created by the Commodity
Exchange Act and the Investment Advisers Act are
equitable and that the underlying customers should
be treated equitably. The Seventh Circuit agreed
with Judge Zagel that “there is no basis for placing
one trust ahead of the other despite FCStone’s and
the CFTC’s attempts to argue otherwise.”57 However, the Seventh Circuit provided no guidance or
explanation of its position other than to state that it
believed that the Cunningham case had more merit
than Begier.58 These cases, among other things, involved the property of the estate issue, which the
Seventh Circuit said was not relevant. More importantly, the Seventh Circuit did not discuss the equality vs. equity trust elements which were noted in my
prior article, that is whether the explicit provisions
found in Section 4d of Commodity Exchange Act
and the specific CFTC regulations, which together
clearly govern how FCMs must handle futures customer property control the issue versus a single SEC
rule that simply states that investment advisers must
deposit their customer assets in one of three types of
custodians.59
The Seventh Circuit thus combined these two
Conclusions of Law in a very strange way. It should
have either not addressed these other legal issues
posited by Judge Zagel or explained its interpretation in more detail.

Possible Impact of The 7TH Circuit’s
Decision on Sentinel I60

As noted in my prior article, Frederick Grede as
the Liquidation Trustee, filed an earlier case against
Bank of New York Mellon (“BONY”), which acted
as the custodian for Sentinel’s repo and futures customer accounts. Grede sought $312 million from
BONY claiming that BONY knew about Sentinel’s fraudulent use of its customer assets and thus
BONY acted inequitably and unlawfully. On August 12, 2012, Judge Zagel ruled that BONY was
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not liable for the actions taken by Sentinel with respect to its fraudulent movement of assets from its
customer accounts to an account held in the name
of Sentinel on BONY’s books. Judge Zagel found
that Grede had “failed to prove that Sentinel made
the Transfers with the actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud its creditors.”61 On November 30,
2012, without any explanation, the 7th Circuit vacated Judge Zagel’s decision in Sentinel I and held
that this appeal remains under consideration by the
panel.62 On August 26, 2013, the 7th Circuit overturned Judge Zagel’s lower court decision regarding
Grede’s fraudulent transfer and equitable subordination claims and remanded the case back to the
district court for further proceedings.

Conclusion

The Trustee has filed a petition before the Seventh
Circuit to request that the Seventh Circuit reconsider its decision. This motion had not been decided as
of the date of this article. It will be interesting to see
whether this motion will be granted or not. It will
also be interesting to see whether the Trustee only
brings the action in Sentinel I against BONY, given
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in that prior case to
remand that case back to the district court, or seeks
to bring both cases (e.g., Sentinel I and II) back simultaneously to the district court. Further, it will be
interesting to see whether either of the two Seventh
Circuit decisions in Sentinel I and II will reach the
U.S. Supreme Court.
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